Possibilities and limitations of internal software

I. Index

1 INTRODUCTION

2 STRUCTURE AND DESCRIPTION OF ASSET MANAGEMENT
2.1 Definition of asset management
2.2 Basic legal principles of asset management
2.3 Kinds of asset management
2.3.1 Asset management as business activity conducted on instruction
2.3.2 TRUST MANAGEMENT
2.3.3 Management of Power
2.4 The contract of consulting service
2.5 Principles of advice doing justice to the investor and the investment
2.6 The asset management contract
2.6.1 Form
2.6.2 CONTENTS OF THE CONTRACT

3 TASKS AND OBLIGATIONS OF THE ASSET MANAGER
3.1 Preparatory duties of information
3.1.1 Principles
3.1.2 CUSTOMER INFORMATION
3.1.2.1 Contents
3.1.2.2 Time of enquiry
3.1.2.3 Representation of the investor
3.1.3 DUTIES OF INFORMATION
3.1.3.1 General principles
3.1.3.2 Special types of investment
3.1.3.3 Moment of information
3.1.3.4 Special agreements between manager and customer
3.1.3.5 Classification of the customer profile
3.1.3.6 Basic legal principles of guidelines
3.2 Markets in Financial Instruments Directive
3.2.1 basic Purpose
3.2.2 Impact on firms
3.2.3 Implementation timetable
3.2.4 Organisational requirements
3.2.5 CONDUCT OF BUSINESS
3.2.6 BEST EXECUTION
3.2.7 Passporting RIGHTS
3.2.8 CLIENT CATEGORISATION
3.2.9 Regulated market and MTF standards
3.2.10 Pre-trade equity transparency
3.2.11 Post-trade equity transparency
3.2.12 Transaction reporting

4 GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF FINANZPORTFOLIOVERWALTUNG AND ITS REQUIREMENTS
4.1 Classification of Finanzportfolioverwaltung
4.2 THE IMPORTANCE OF THE MARKET MAKER SOFTWARE IN Finanzportfolioverwaltung
4.3 GENERAL REQUIREMENTS
4.4 TYPICAL TASKS AND REQUIREMENTS
4.4.1 Customer controlling
4.4.2 Execution of security orders
4.4.3 Control of earnings

5 specification of requirements and definition of the catalogue of REQUIREMENTS
5.1 GENERAL INFORMATION ABOUT THE CATALOGUE OF REQUIREMENTS
5.2 REQUIREMENT CATALOGUE “CUSTOMER CONTROLLING”
5.2.1 Survey of managed investment and of mandate
5.2.2 Changes of the volume managed and the mandates
5.2.3 Survey of the mandates managed
5.3 REQUIREMENT CATALOGUE “TRANSACTION ORDER“
5.3.1 Purchase of securities
5.3.1.1 Differentiation of kinds of purchase orders
5.3.1.2 Registration of purchase orders
5.3.1.3 Bank specific block orders for security purchase
5.3.2 Sale of securities
5.3.2.1 Differentiation of types with sales orders
5.3.2.2 Registration of sales orders
5.3.2.3 Bank specific block orders for security sales
5.4 REQUIREMENT CATALOGUE “RETURN CONTROLLING”
5.4.1 Control of the commissions received from banks in terms of correctness AND completeness
5.4.2 Allotment of commission for customers and advisor

6 description, limitation and evaluation of instruments for THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOLUTIONS
6.1 INDIVIDUAL SOLUTION BY A SOFTWARE COMPANY
6.2 INDIVIDUAL SOLUTIONS BASED ON MARKET MAKER
6.3 SAP, ORACLE DATA BANKS AND SOLUTIONS OF BANKS
6.4 Flexibility vs. cost effectiveness
6.5 Crystal Reports with MM Talk as extension of Market Maker
6.6 EXTERNAL SOLUTIONS AS EXTENSION FOR MM TALK AND ADDITIONAL SOURCES for Crystal Reports

7 SOLUTIONS
7.1 Combination of possibilities of solutions
7.2 Customer controlling
7.2.1 Data gathering
7.2.2 Report Mandate
7.2.3 Report class size
7.2.4 Report asset classes
7.3 Execution of security orders
7.3.1 Instrument and basis of development of applications
7.3.2 Origin of customer dates
7.3.3 Structure of the application
7.3.3.1 Log-In
7.3.3.2 Purchase of securities
7.3.3.3 Sale of securities
7.3.3.4 Survey of registered orders of an advisor
7.3.3.5 Administrative and trade functions
7.4 Return controlling
7.4.1 Provision of comparable turnovers from Market Maker
7.4.2 Comparison of bank lists with the turnovers from Market Maker
7.4.3 REPORTING FOR RETURNS BY ADVISORS AND CUSTOMERS

8 EVALUATION OF POSSIBILITIES AND LIMITATIONS OF THE SOLUTIONS
8.1 Fundamental evaluations of the solutions
8.2 COST-BENEFIT RELATIONSHIP
8.3 Advantages and disadvantages of the solutions
8.4 Summary and final evaluation

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1 Introduction

In modem and independent asset management (in the following the author uses the German synonym “Finanzportfolioverwaltung”) and next to the development of in­vestment strategies for the customers’ deposit organization is one of the central is­sues to guarantee the efficient and effective processing and control of decisions. The author of this thesis has worked out a software programme so as to guarantee the extension of dealing with orders, the controlling of returns and the general manage­ment of the customers and to make this more transparent.

The private and independent asset manager is in charge of his customers’ invest­ments making his own decisions and arrangements. He does so within the framework of a contract concluded with the customer in accordance with the guidelines agreed upon and on the basis of a power of disposition with regard to the bank running the deposit.

The tasks and instruments of an asset manager are similar to those of a bank and by comparison even enlarge the spectrum of possibilities and alternative investment. Being independent, private and therefore mostly small up to medium-sized enter­prises, however, they do not have the organizational and technical means of a bank at their disposal.

In practice this fact entails a difference in the organization of carrying out and con­trolling share orders, the controlling of the resulting returns and the management of the customer. In this latter respect, especially with a view to the auditor’s require­ments, the author will particularly focus on a survey of the situation of the enterprise for the executive board. For these special requirements no standard solutions on the EDP (Electronic Data Processing) - market are existent.

This thesis aims at extending the existing software solutions or even creating a new application which guarantees both the flawless compliance with the criteria men­tioned above and at drawing up surveys and status reports in a simplified way.

The requirements and results of this thesis go along the lines of an asset manager and are to be put into practice.

At the beginning chapter 2: “Structure and Description of Asset Management” ex­plains private and independent Finanzportfolioverwaltung in principle to enable the reader to get an overall view of this area of business. The difference to current advice on investment will be exemplified by means of legal requirements on Finanzport- folioverwaltung. Following the general description, chapter 3: “Tasks and Obliga­tions of the Asset Manager” will further specify these as required by the law in order to provide the basis for the following steps.

After the description of the legal framework, chapter 4 expounds the “General De­scription of Finanzportfolioverwaltung and its Requirements”. For further delimita­tion the theoretical and entrepreneurial needs with regard to the carrying out of trans­action orders as well as customer and return controlling will be described.

Starting from the combination of legal requirements and duties to be observed by Finanzportfolioverwaltung and the entrepreneurial requirements, chapter 5: “Speci­fication of requirements and definition of the catalogue of requirements” presents the catalogue of requirements for drawing up the corresponding software.

Subsequent to this, chapter 6: “Description, limitation and evaluation of instruments for the development of solutions” presents possible ways which may well lead to solutions. The possibilities will be compared with each other and judged with regard to the asset management and their characteristics.

Thus the first six chapters comprise the exact delimitation of the legal and entrepre­neurial basic conditions and requirements and the catalogue of requirements derived from it. On this basis, chapter 7: “Solutions” creates an application based on the databank which guarantees that investment orders will be carried out in a more effi­cient and effective way and moreover enables effective customer and return control­ling.

Finally chapter 8: “Evaluation of possibilities and limitations of the solutions” evalu­ates the application in its strong and weak points with a view to the requirements, classifies the proposals being put into practice accordingly.

Special emphasis will be laid on those requirements which can possibly not be real­ized so as to give a precise classification of the resulting risks.

2 Structure and description of asset management

2.1 Definition of asset management

Asset management is generally defined as “management of property which does not belong to the manager but to a third person”.¹ The manager makes the decisions con­cerning the investment of money according to the interest of the customer, however at his discretion having to stick to the guidelines which have been agreed upon.² Other than in negotiating or advising investment where the customer makes the deci­sions the asset manager is characterized by making decisions by himself.³ Only the manager is in charge of the development of the investment. Bearing the customer’s interest in mind he makes his own dutiful decisions.⁴

A further distinguishing feature is duration. Whereas information and advice is regu­larly finished with giving the information and respectively the advice on investment which ends the legal relationship between advisor and customer⁵, the asset manager is continually responsible for the customer’s investment.⁶ This legal Relationship only ends on the expiry of the period agreed upon respectively the cancellation of the contract.

Despite this dissociation from other financial services there does not exist a stand­ardized concept of asset management.⁷ An extensive interpretation of asset manage­ment includes all kinds of activities related to capital investment by private or institu­tional investors in one way or another.⁸

Asset management can correctly be defined as “management of any kind of asset by institutional and private investors in the form of real values and claims by a manager in charge with all those tasks”.⁹

In principle asset management can refer to all sorts of valuables and assets.¹⁰ Such as the management of real estate, stocks and shares and shareholding of investment and closed property funds, precious metals, objects of art, antiques, coins as well as in­vestment in such assets.

Normally there is a difference between collective and individual asset management. Collective asset management is offered especially by capital investment companies and assurance companies. It consists of the acquisition of shares of funds or taking out an insurance.¹¹ In collective asset management the exertion of influence by the investor by means of setting guidelines or individual instructions is regularly out of the question. Collective asset management is frequently combined with advice on investment, when a bank recommends to invest in a determined fund. In this case the bank acts as advisor, whereas the investment company - by law a capital investment company - plays the role of asset manager according to the KAGG.

In case the investor wants to be able to exert influence on the investment decision or intends to have a more intensive control he decides on an individual asset manage­ment. Apart from banks and financial institutions there are mainly so called freelance asset managers (so called Finanzportfolioverwalter), i.e. such companies that do not do banking at the same time as well as members of tax consultant professions like lawyers¹², chartered accountants or companies of chartered accountants.¹³ Part of these so-called freelance “Finanzportfolioverwalter” is management of financial portfolio for which the results of this thesis shall be applied.¹⁴

An individual asset management frequently depends on a certain minimum invest­ment which - according to the provider and the target group - may vary from 50.000 € to 500.000 €.¹⁵

In the management company in question it is common agreement that even a small investment can be managed efficiently and effectively provided that corresponding instruments are used. In managing smaller investments umbrella funds can be used for diversification, for example.

2.2 Basic legal principles of asset management

In order to implement the EU directives,¹⁶ the adequacy of capital¹⁷ and the BCCI directives, on 05/06/2006 the legislator passed the law on the implementation of EU directives for the harmonisation of the regulations (6th KWG amendment) dating from 22/10/1997¹⁸. Within the framework of this law passed 01/01/1998 “the management of individual assets invested in financial instruments for third per­sons with a scope of decision (Finanzportfolioverwaltung) was integrated into KWG as financial service according to the requirement of §1 Abs. 1a Satz 2 Nr. 3.¹⁹ Those companies which perform financial services for others on such a scale which requires business operations along commercial lines²⁰ and which are no credit insti­tutions are consequently referred to as institutes for financial services.²¹ Persons and companies which offer asset management have therefore been subject to supervision by “Bundesaufsichtsamt fur das Kreditwesen” since 01/01/1998 (since 01/05/2002 “Bundesanstalt fur Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht”) and need to have a licence ac­cording to §32 KWG.²² According to §1 Abs. 1a Satz 2 Nr. 3, the manager of an in­vestment club which has a legal structure according to the civil law must have a licence, too.²³

Furthermore, in 1997 asset management was integrated as investment service into the law of securities trade by the implementation law.²⁴

§2 Abs. 3 Nr. 6 WpHG defines asset management (Finanzportfolioverwaltung, cf.

§1 Abs. 1a Satz 2 Nr. 3 KWG) as „...the management of other people’s individual investment in securities, money market instruments or derivates including scope of decision”.²⁵

2.3 Kinds of asset management

2.3.1 Asset management as business activity conducted on in­struction

The asset management contract is qualified as a service contract of business activities conducted on instructions so that according to § 675 BGB the rules and regulations of the §§ 663, 665 to 670, 672 to 674 and regularly also § 671 Abs. 2 BGB apply.²⁶ By general agreement the same goes for § 664 in analogy whereas the opposite inter­pretation wants § 613 BGB to be applied as business activities conducted on instruc­tions does strictly not include an effect of exclusion.²⁷

In the upshot, however, this argument is irrelevant because there is general agree­ment that the asset manager has to render the services of asset management in per- son²⁸ that is to say the contract does not constitute a management contract (so-called „Geschaftsbesorgungsvertrag“) but a contract of services (so-called „Werkvertrag“)²⁹ according to § 611 BGB.³⁰ Because of the management contract the manager is ob­liged to continually manage the customer’s assets in the latter’s interest and in com­pliance with the investment regulations until the cessation of the contract.³¹ How­ever, the manager is under no obligation to regularly produce a determined return on investment,³² unless he has explicitly assured a certain return.

In principle the asset manager is obliged to render his services in person; he is not entitled to transfer the job execution to a third party.³³ By predominant judgement this legal duty results from an analogue application of § 664 Abs. 1 Satz 1 BGB³⁴ and arises from the nature of the asset management contract. Since the investor has special confidence in the manager within the framework of the contract job execution in person is obligatory.³⁵

If the manager is a legal person he is responsible for the personal job execution and not the employees.³⁶ This obligation, however, only extends to the “making of the investment decision and thereby to the essential element of the duty to protect the interests”³⁷ and not to the realization of this investment decision.

In case the asset manager is a legal person, he may also fulfil his obligations not only with his agency but also with experienced employees³⁸ should this be necessary under the circumstances or in the given situation.³⁹ They are then the manager’s as­sistants.⁴⁰

In this context the question arises whether the manager is allowed to make a transac­tion which is already managed by a third party.⁴¹

This may happen as far as share certificates of public investment funds (cf. § 1 Abs. 1 KAGG, § 1 Abs. 1 AuslInvestmG) which is typically managed by an investment company.⁴² The manager transfers his obligation to act in person to the investment company.⁴³ This way of action regularly entails double costs for the investor as these are incurred both with the manager and the company.⁴⁴

Nevertheless the acquisition of investment shares is generally considered admissible unless there are other investment directives.⁴⁵ The reason being that - considering diversification or risk limitation - such an acquisition may be reasonable or even necessary, especially when investment shall be made in foreign capital markets.⁴⁶ In such cases investment by a qualified company having intimate knowledge of the market in question is certainly wiser than the attempt to make a qualified investment from the distance.⁴⁷

2.3.2 Trust management

Basically there are two different kinds of asset management. The investor himself may be the proprietor of the managed assets or he can transfer the ownership thereof to the manager. This is called “trust management”.⁴⁸

The assets are transferred to the manager although only for the sake of management and according to the trust agreement.⁴⁹ This commitment, however, only pertains to the relationship between the two parties and cannot be discerned by a third party.⁵⁰ The manager acts on behalf of the customer.

The investor only has a claim in personam on the retransfer of ownership and man­agement according to contract.⁵¹ The trust relationship is based on a legal transaction in two acts: first the conclusion of the trust contract in personam which defines the trustee’s rights and responsibilities and limits the power of disposition.⁵² Simulta­neously a second legal transaction is effected which transfers the power of disposi­tion of the assets which are the object of the contract.

The legal nature of trust management is not undisputed at all.⁵³ Since trust manage­ment does not exist as a legal category, the legal relationship between the parties has to be defined more closely in terms of the special circumstances of each case and of the explicit or assumed will of either side.⁵⁴

According to Roll the trust-model must be qualified as irregular keeping (§ 700 Abs. 1 BGB) as the investor’s right to retransfer of ownership aims at the retransferof goods of the same kind, kind and quantity.⁵⁵ The directives concerning the loan (§ 607ff. BGB) apply to the irregular keeping according to § 700 Abs. 1 Sathl BGB. The correct objection to this interpretation is the argument that an investor is not in­tent on having “goods of the same kind and quality” retransferred after the end of the management contract.⁵⁶ From the investor’s and manager’s point of view the latter is obliged to release at the end of the contract whatever he obtained while the contract was in force. After a certain duration of management,there will hardly be a compa­rable quantity, kind and quality of the initial investment. With the trust-model being a “special kind of irregular keeping” it is self-evident to qualify it in personam as genuine trust-contract.⁵⁷ By classic definition trust is characterized by the fact that the trustor transfers rights of investment or power to the trustee which the latter may only use in accordance with a trust agreement in personam.⁵⁸ Typical of trust is the trustee’s authority that exceeds the links of interior relationship in its relationship to the outside world. This is the very essence and purpose of asset management thought to be genuine trust. With the asset manager being obliged to act on behalf of the in­vestor this is a form of trust for the benefit of other person, legally a business management contract.⁵⁹

If asset management is executed within the trust-model, the manager must have a licence to do banking business (§ 32 Abs.1 KWG) because both the receipt of cus­tomers’ money on his own behalf (Einlagengeschaft, § 1 Abs. 1 Nr. 1 KWG) and the keeping and management of securities for third persons (§1 Abs. 1 Satz 2 Nr. 5 KWG) is banking business.⁶⁰

2.3.3 Management of Power

In the Federal Republic the prevailing construction of asset management is the so- called proxy-model, also called management by power.⁶¹ In this version the investor remains owner of the assets managed by the manager. The manager is only author­ized to make dispositions of the investor’s assets in personam within the frame of guidelines that both have agreed upon.⁶² With the proxy-model the manager’s dis­positions are executed not according to a real trust relationship (for the benefit of others), but openly by proxy.⁶³ The manager makes dispositions on behalf of a third party for account of a third party. The regulations of §§ 164 ff. BGB⁶⁴ apply. How­ever, Balzer points out rightly that the legal position of the managing bank can be extended by an authorization according to § 185 Abs. 1 BGB namely to make dispo­sitions of the trusted assets on its own behalf.⁶⁵ This authority is limited to one which competes with the investor’s legal authority as the latter’s right of disposition is not totally excluded.⁶⁶

The regular basis of asset management is a service contract (§ 675 BGB) which may include elements of a service contract - as in the case of the trust-model.⁶⁷ Here, too, the manager is obliged to render his services in person and is not entitled to place sub-powers/authorizations. The agreement between investor and asset manager may nevertheless include differing regulations. If a portfolio service company acts as as­set management and simultaneously as deposit bank, an agreement on the exemption from § 181 BGB should be arrived at between the investor and the company. Other­wise conflicts might originate if the company executes transactions for its own ac­count or of commission.⁶⁸

If on the basis of the management contract the manager is entitled to dispose of the investor’s deposit, a special agreement is indispensable, i.e. the investor must have full power over the investor’s deposit. A power of acquisition (§13 Abs. 1 DepotG) is not needed.⁶⁹ On the other hand a mere power of account or deposit is in itself not yet an order for the management of the assets kept there.⁷⁰

2.4 The contract of consulting service

The asset manager, too, is responsible for determined duties of giving information and advice until the conclusion of the contract.^{71 72} There is a difference between an existing consultation contract and the actual asset management contract which the investor does or does not conclude on the basis of the previously “executed” consul­tation contract.

Some commentators object to the conclusion of such a contract on the grounds that the investor’s mere possibility - which is due to the service character of the manage­ment contract - of exerting influence cannot justify a consultation contract. As the asset manager acts on behalf of the investor there is no comparable interest as in con­sultation. Should an independent consultation contract be considered prior to the as­set management contract it would be doubtful “if the typical acquisition talks are not misinterpreted which leads to an unnecessary complication”.⁷³

This interpretation, however, does not take into consideration the purpose of a con­sultation contract, namely to level out the difference of information between the asset management company and the investor and to explain to the latter the risks and me­chanisms of the kind of investment chosen by him.⁷⁴ The BGH (Supreme Court) has ruled with reference to the bond-decision that as a rule the conclusion of a consulta­tion contract is a tacit understanding when the advisor gives the investor advice on investment.⁷⁵ Then it is irrelevant whether the customer has approached the company or whether the company have offered their services to the customer first⁷⁶ or whatever the subject or intention of the consultation is. This may aim both at a trans­action and the conclusion of an asset management contract. Balzer’s correct opinion is that already with the beginning of negotiations (which are supposed to end in the conclusion of an asset management contract) an additional legal transaction in the form of a consultation contract is concluded.⁷⁷ Since the customer has a similar inter­est despite the differences between consultation and asset management - another form, e. g. a so-called agreement to take care of the assets, is imaginable⁷⁸ - there is no objection to the transfer of these principles - the regular intention being to enable the customer to make a concrete decision.⁷⁹

2.5 Principles of advice doing justice to the investor and the investment

The principles developed for the standard business in stocks and bonds which refer to exploration and information can be transferred on asset management.⁸⁰ This is pos­sible both within an obligation prior to the conclusion of an asset management con­tract and after the conclusion thereof. Here, too, there is a difference between the obligation prior to the conclusion until the conclusion of a contract and the duties from the asset management contract proper. Until this is concluded, the manager is subject to the “general” obligations, mostly on the basis of an (independent) consul­tation contract.⁸¹ It does not make any difference whether the advice aims at the pur­chase of any special security or the conclusion of an asset management contract.

The purchase of a determined security implies the end of the obligations from the consultation contract. If this contract aims at asset management, it ends with the con­clusion of the pertaining contract.⁸² Then the asset manager’s duties are no longer derived from the consultation contract but directly from the asset management con- tract.⁸³

After the conclusion of this contract duties of information and consultation may arise from it be it as a main duty or a side line duty of this legal transaction.⁸⁴ Other than in the case of consultation the legal relationship between manager and investor does not end after the conclusion of the asset management contract but is still valid albeit with a different objective.

If there are no prerequisites for the conclusion of a consultation contract, e.g. if the customer does not want any advice explicitly or implicitly⁸⁵ there are nevertheless duties prior to the conclusion of a contract the violation of which may Entail claims according to the “culpa in contrahendo” principle.⁸⁶ The beginning of contract negotiations or of a similar kind leads to a relationship similar to a contract (§ 311 Abs. 2, 241 Abs. 2 BGH) which - on the basis of the confidence shown - ma­terializes in the in the duty of information and control prior to the conclusion of the contract.⁸⁷

2.6 The asset management contract

2.6.1 Form

For the time being the conclusion of an asset management contract⁸⁸ does not require a certain form, it is possible to do it orally or conclusively.⁸⁹ There is an exception when the asset management is responsible for transactions which themselves require a form as in the case of acquisition of shares of limited companies or real estate. U­sually asset management contract are concluded in writing, a conclusive procedure is only an exception.⁹⁰ In principle an authorized representative of the investor may conclude an asset management contract. It must be taken into consideration that a power of account does not entitle the representative to grant any sub-powers and thus it is no legitimation for “engaging” an asset manager. In a sentence passed 18/06/1997 Oberlandesgericht Celle⁹¹ ruled that a deposit contract without asset management implies only the secure and true safekeeping of securities. The cus­tomer, not the bank, has to watch the market values and judge possible returns of an option.⁹²

2.6.2 Contents of the contract

As a rule, the asset management contract used by banks are pre-formulated written agreements which can be qualified as general conditions of business.⁹³ As in the case of so-called consumer contracts there is no need for repeated use of the form § 310 Abs. 3 BGB applies which stipulates the application of §§ 305c Abs. 2, 306, 307-309 BGB to pre-formulated conditions of contract also in those cases when they are destined to be used just once and as far as could not - due to its pre­formulation - exert any influence on the contents. According to § 310 Abs. 3 BGB only natural persons are consumers; this regulation does not apply to legal persons self-employed persons and other enterprises. As § 310 Abs. 3 BGB stipulates the limitation to certain types of contract, asset management contracts are to be qualified as consumer contracts in terms of AGB as long as they are pre-formulated condi- tions.⁹⁴

Ideally the asset management contract fixes all details which are of interest both for the investor and the manager. Among these are the form of the management contract - trust model or proxy model (including the regulations about the scope of power) - and the authority of the asset manager. Guide lines can be integrated which fix the agreements on the allowed types of investment, their maximum scope (diversifica­tion) and the structure of the investment.⁹⁵ Other items to be included are commis­sion, reporting, liberation from the limitations of § 181 BGB options for cancellation of the contract and pertaining agreements on liability.⁹⁶ Normally the liability of the asset manager is confined to intent and culpable negligence.⁹⁷ As a rule, the asset management contract contains the liberation from liability for those transactions which the manager executes on instructions by the customer.⁹⁸ The fact that the man­ager is liable for culpable negligence when executing duties fixed in the contract can frequently be found in asset management contracts. But this is only a description of the legal situation since jurisdiction does not accept the liberation from liability.⁹⁹ In the absence of regulations about the methods of management, the principles re­garding asset management according to the rules are in force.¹⁰⁰ In this context there is the manager’s responsibility “in terms of prudence of a straight trader”.¹⁰¹ Usually the asset management contract includes - like almost any contract nowadays - s- called final regulations which among other items include the paragraph by which alterations of the contract are only effective when agreed upon in writing. According to J. Muller’s correct view conclusive behaviour or continuous execution is of par­ticular importance in asset management.¹⁰² The longer the actually executed asset management departs from the agreements¹⁰³ with the investor in the know the sooner an implied alteration is to be supposed.¹⁰⁴ In this context one has to consider the pur­pose of asset management: very often the investor concludes an asset management contract with the asset manager because he cannot or does not want to take care of managing his own assets and recurs to the service of manager.¹⁰⁵ Unless the man­agement contract contains a differing regulation, the investor is not obliged to control the manager whether he sticks to the agreements or guide lines.¹⁰⁶ If the investor does not interfere this cannot be taken as evidence of an implied alteration of the contract.

On the other hand the investor may be partly guilty when he recognizes the asset manager’s activities contrary to the contract and tolerates it for any length of time. Even more so when the manager has regularly informed the investor about his in­vestment policy¹⁰⁷ and the investor does not object to the statements made available to him.¹⁰⁸

3 Tasks and obligations of the asset manager

3.1 Preparatory duties of information

3.1.1 Principles

According to Horn, the asset manager “has in principle the least duties of giving in­formation and advice for the service he renders consists of making decisions on be­half of the customer.”¹⁰⁹ This does not mean that he does not have any obligations. In actual fact the manager has by and large a considerably greater “responsibility” than an advisor who “only” gives advice on individual transactions. The investor has great confidence in him and authorizes him to make decisions in his name and at his dis­cretion - of course only within the contractual agreement.¹¹⁰ The asset manager is obliged to execute his management with great care (which is self-evident) to avoid conflicts of interest between himself and the customer or between different custom­ers among one another¹¹¹ and to watch out for the variation of risks.¹¹² The obligation to act according to §§ 31 et seq. WpHG is not limited to brokerage and consultation, “it holds good for asset management”.¹¹³ This, of course, goes without saying due to the legal duties of the investment advisor regarding careful asset management. These duties are based on the law of transactions.

With the law passed 22/10/1997¹¹⁴ asset management is explicitly considered as bro­kerage.

This results from the trust-like character of asset management of which the care of third persons’ assets is typical.

The asset manager manages an investment which economically spoken is not his property. He alone makes investment decisions at his discretion but on behalf of the investor.¹¹⁵ Since the effects and consequences of the conclusion of an asset man­agement contract may be much more important than those of an individual transac- tion¹¹⁶ the aspect of customer protection is more important, too. Actually, the asset manager’s duties of information and c9onsultation must be rated by his specific task: making decisions on behalf of the investor.¹¹⁷

3.1.2 Customer information

3.1.2.1 Contents

The influence which the asset manager may have on the assets of the investor re­quires it “to demand information from the customers about their knowledge¹¹⁸ and experience with security transactions, about their aims and financial situation”.¹¹⁹ It is the asset manager’s duty to get information about the investor’s financial situation so as to be able to assess his ability to take risks before the contract is concluded re­spectively during negotiations. The duty to have a clear notion of the customer ex­tends to the latter’s readiness to take risks and to his individual objectives.¹²⁰ The BAWe guideline regarding §§ 31, 32 WpHG concretizes this duty of exploration of the customer (§ 31 Abs. 2 Satz 1 Nr. 1 WpHG).

In this context it has to be considered that asset management - other than advice on investment - is not limited to a concrete transaction but to a great number thereof.^{121 122} If the asset management contract stipulates management at the manager’s discretion, the duty find out about the investor’s experience and knowledge is very comprehen­sive. It has to cover all types of transactions the manager intends to execute.¹²³ If on the other hand asset management is confined to certain types of transaction only, the manager has to make sure about these fields only whether and to which extent the customer has any knowledge and experience. ¹²⁴ The same goes for the customer’s ability to take risks. Obviously the risk of suffering substantial losses is significantly greater with speculative investments than with so-called conservative securities or investment funds containing different securities.¹²⁵

If the manager has known the customer for some time and can therefore assess his knowledge he is not necessarily obliged to question the customer about his ex- peri3nce and knowledge, his ability and inclination to take risks.¹²⁶ Further hints can be taken from the customer’s job or profession and his education.¹²⁷ The limitations of investigation are laid down in § 31 Abs. 2 Satz 1 zweiter Halbsatz WpHG: the company’s obligation to investigate is determined by the customer’s in­terest and with a view to the type and volume of the planned investment. Individual circumstances derived from the investor’s personality have also to be allowed for.¹²⁸ Investigation is dispensable if there is no need for protection of the customer any more - then the customer’s professionalism has to be considered according to Art. 11 Abs. 1 Satz 2 EU investment service guideline.¹²⁹ Apart from the customer’s person­ality, the same goes for the type and risk of the planned investment. The greater the risk and volume and type of the respective investment are with a view to the cus­tomer’s experience and knowledge as well as his ability and inclination to take risks the greater are the requirements concerning the intensity of the duty to investigate.¹³⁰ On the other hand the company is not obliged to check up on the customer’s informa­tion.¹³¹ If he claims to have sufficient knowledge of the mechanisms and risks of the planned investment or knowingly even gives wrong information the asset manager may rely on it.¹³²

There is a parallel to the problem of deception about the capacity of contract of fu­tures. If an investor has deceived the bank maliciously about this, he cannot invoke objection to futures according to the principle of unlawful execution of rights. In these cases the principles of invalidity of form due to unlawful practice Apply: he who has maliciously deceived his business partner about the form re­quirement or has prevented the observance of form from the very beginning in order to possibly keep a backdoor open cannot invoke the fault of form.¹³³ Should the investor deliberately pretend to have sufficient knowledge and experience and if the company does not make any more investigations according to § 31 Abs. 2 Satz 1 Nr. 1 WpHG, it would be abuse of the law if the customer might later invoke insufficient investigation on the part of the company. The duty of information prior to the conclusion of the contract is not supposed for the benefit of the customer if he deceives his business partner about his experience.¹³⁴

The literature has different answers to the question if and to which extent the bank has to check upon the customer’s knowledge. Some authors maintain the customer’s statements of his experience do not suffice; an objective check upon his experience in the field in question has to be carried out. Others hold that the duty of information does not “aim at making the investor happy by force” for each such act leads to pa­ternalism which cannot be justified by the dangers and risks.

Both interpretations agree in that the customer’s wish not to be informed has to be respected in principle. As Nobbe states correctly, ignorance of the customer’s lack of experience may not be due to grave negligence of the bank obliged to make enqui- ries.¹³⁵ In this context the customer’s “cleverness” has to be taken into account. The situation requires a different interpretation “if the investor’s self-presentation is evi­dently not reliable or if there are even signs of abnormal overestimation of his own capabilities.¹³⁶

3.1.2.2 Time of enquiry

At the moment of concluding the contract the company must have a clear insight into the customer’s personality. However, this does not suffice in view of the nature of the asset management contract as a permanent obligation.¹³⁷ During the term of va­lidity of the contract the asset manager must periodically inquire whether there any essential change have come about in the investor’s personal situation or financial circumstances.¹³⁸ According to the BaFin (the former BAEe) directive concerning §§ 31,32 WpHG the customer has to be informed that he must let the manager know any changes in his circumstances. But there is no statutory duty in this respect (§32 Abs. 2 Satz 2 WpHG).¹³⁹ For this reason the asset manager has to inquire about pos­sible changes of the customer’s economic circumstances or investment objectives.¹⁴⁰ On the other hand the asset manager need not make any further enquiries if he is in the know about the customer’s experience, knowledge and his objectives because of long standing business relations.¹⁴¹

The question arises whether there will be legal liabilities if the manager does not or cannot attend his duties of enquiry (§ 31 Abs. 2 Satz 1 Nr. 1 WpHG) because the customer refuses to give information. The strict wording of this paragraph implies an explicit duty of enquiry, otherwise the asset manager might be liable for non- observance.¹⁴² The same seems to hold for the principles of advice doing justice to the investor which were developed by the jurisdiction.¹⁴³ In this context it is neces­sary to differentiate between who is responsible for non-observance of the duty of enquiry. If it is the manager’s fault, he is liable for any losses incurred by the inves­tor. If on the other hand the customers refuses to give information or gives insuffi­cient or even incorrect information about himself there is no liability on the part of the manager. According to § 31 Abs. 2 Satz 2 WpHG the customer is under no obli- gation to give information about himself or financial circumstances. And the man­ager cannot “force” the customer to do so.¹⁴⁴ Neither the investor's responsibility nor the wording of the law are consistent with an exaggeration of the manager’s duty of enquiry.¹⁴⁵ If the manager can get no insight into the customer’s personality, his in­vestment objectives and financial

Potential he has no choice but to reject the conclusion of the asset management con­tract - he is under no obligation of conclusion.¹⁴⁶ Neither is there an obligation to reject a management contract on the grounds of lack of information by the customer or for the management “to be cautious”.¹⁴⁷ Moreover the asset manager is not ob­liged to check upon the customer’s statements,¹⁴⁸ but he can take them for granted and focus on them for his services of information and advice.¹⁴⁹ Intervals between enquiries can depend on the risks of the executed investments. Koller’s suggestion of annual enquiries¹⁵⁰ imply the danger of institutionalization of the duty of enquiry and of mechanical execution without consideration of actual changes. Annual enquiry may be appropriate as a standard. Obviously the asset man­ager will react to any changes in the customer’s person and financial circum-stances as soon as he knows of them. The same goes for high losses due to determined trans­actions.¹⁵¹

3.1.2.3 Representation of the investor

As a bank often has no direct dealings with an investor but an external asset manager takes care of the customer’s investment kept by the bank that has to be informed and given advice. Since the asset manager acts on behalf of the investor, in these cases not the investor but the manager is the customer of the financial services company. The consequence is that only the manager - as mediator - is to be given information and advice.¹⁵² And the obligation of giving information and advice to the investor is exclusively the manager’s task. In this respect it is pure formalism to oblige the bank with a view to enquiries, information and where applicable, advice (§§ 31 et seq. WpHG). If the investor has an expert third person acting on his behalf, § 31 WpHG does not apply to the bank which only keeps the account and deposit because for the sake of protection of the customer’s interest there is no need for this.¹⁵³ Various adaptations of BaFin’s directive (§§ 31,32 WpHG) allow for this problem. Part B, Ziffer 2, 2. Abschnitt of the directive reads: “In evaluating the customer it can be considered, especially in the case of multi-level brokerage whether the customer has already been informed. In this case special information of the customer is re­quired about the risks inherent to the sphere of the financial service company in question.” Whereas sentence 1 allows for the suggestions from practical experience, namely to avoid several identical services of information of the customer, the re­quirement to inform him “about the risks inherent to the sphere of the financial ser­vice company in question” may give rise to considerable practical problems because the kind of risks must be identified first of all. It is commonly agreed that the com­pany must not ignore completely the investor’s interest.¹⁵⁴ should there be hints that the manager engaged does not act in the customer’s interest or should the company realize that the asset manager’s qualification differs considerably from that of “an average asset manager” and that therefore the customer’s interests is no longer pro­tected, the company is obliged to point this out to the investor. In evident cases the company can refuse to execute the asset manager’s orders.¹⁵⁵

[...]

---

¹ Cf. Balzer, Vermogensverwaltung durch Kreditinstitute, p. 13.

² Cf. Roll, Vermogensverwaltung durch Kreditinstitute, p. 24.

³ Cf. Wicke, Individuelle Vermogensverwaltung fur Privatkunden, p. 19; Balzer, Vermogensverwal­tung durch Kreditinstitute, p. 15; Jendralski und Oehlenschlager, Vermogensverwaltung und Vermo- gensbetreuung, p. 10.

⁴ Assmann und Schneider, Wertpapierhandelsgesetz (Kommentar), §31 Rn. 22.

⁵ Cf. OLG Dusseldorf WM 1994, 1468, 1469: OLG Karlsruhe WM 1992, 577; OLG Koln WM 1989, 402, 404; Balzer, Vermogensverwaltung durch Kreditinstitute, p. 15.

⁶ Cf. Balzer, Vermogensverwaltung durch Kreditinstitute, p. 15.

⁷ Cf. Becker und Wicke, Rechtsfragen der Vermogensverwaltung, p. 4 et seq.

⁸ Cf. Brunner und Vollath, Handbuch Finanzdienstleistungen, p. 338-339; Becker und Wicke, Rechts- fragen der Vermogensverwaltung, p. 5.

⁹ Cf. Balzer, Vermogensverwaltung durch Kreditinstitute, p. 12.

¹⁰ Cf. Roll, Vermogensverwaltung durch Kreditinstitute, p. 9, 28; Becker und Wicke, Rechtsfragen der Vermogensverwaltung, p. 4; Balzer, Vermogensverwaltung durch Kreditinstitute, p. 12; Jendralski und Oehlenschlager, Vermogensverwaltung und Vermogensbetreuung, p. 10.

¹¹ Cf. Balzer, Vermogensverwaltung durch Kreditinstitute, p. 19.

¹² Cf. Balzer, Vermogensverwaltung durch Kreditinstitute, p. 25.

¹³ Cf. Balzer, Vermogensverwaltung durch Kreditinstitute, p. 25.

¹⁴ Comment by the author.

¹⁵ Cf. Brunner und Vollath, Handbuch Finanzdienstleistungen, p. 308, 310; Balzer, Vermogensverwal- tung durch Kreditinstitute, p. 25.

¹⁶Richtlinie 93/22/EWG, Abl. Nr. L 141/27 et seq.

¹⁷

Richtlinie 93/6/EWG, Abl. Nr. L 141/1 et seq.

¹⁸ Gesetz zur Umsetzung von EG-Richtlinien zur Harmonisierung bank- und wertpapieraufsichtrecht- licher Vorschriften (6. KWG-Novelle) vom 22.10.1997, BGBI. I. p. 2518 et seq. Begleitgesetz zum Gesetz zur Umsetzung von EG-Richtlinien zur Harmonisierung bank- wertpapieraufsichtrechtlicher Vorschriften (6. KWG-Novelle) vom 22.10.1997, BGB1. I, p. 2567 et seq.; Balzer, Vermogensver- waltung durch Kreditinstitute, p. 59 et seq.

¹⁹ Cf. Horn und Schimansky, Bankrecht 1998, p. 265, 267, 271.

²⁰ See BAKred, Infoblatt 1/97 fur inlandische Unternehmen im Finanzdienstleistungssektor.

²¹ Cf. Balzer, Vermogensverwaltung durch Kreditinstitute, p. 57 et seq.

²² Cf. Horn und Schimansky, Bankrecht 1998, p. 265, 271.

²³ Cf. BAKred, Hinweise fur Investmentclubs in der Rechtsform der Gesellschaft burgerlichen Rechts im Hinblick auf den Tatbestand der Finanzportfolioverwaltung im Sinne von § 1 Abs. la Satz 2 Nr. 3 KWG.

²⁴ Cf. Assmann und Schneider, Wertpapierhandelsgesetz (Kommentar), Rn. 32 et seq.

²⁵ Cf. Balzer, Vermogensverwaltung durch Kreditinstitute, p. 64.

²⁶ Cf. Roll, Vermogensverwaltung durch Kreditinstitute, p. 48; Balzer, Vermogensverwaltung durch Kreditinstitute, p. 42; Horn und Schimansky, Bankrecht 1998, p. 265, 270.

²⁷ Cf. Roll, Vermogensverwaltung durch Kreditinstitute, p. 150.

²⁸ Cf. Assmann und Schneider, Wertpapierhandelsgesetz (Kommentar), § 31 Rn. 22.

²⁹ Cf. Balzer, Vermogensverwaltung durch Kreditinstitute, p. 43 et seq.; Assmann und Schneider, Wertpapierhandelsgesetz (Kommentar), § 31 Rn. 22; Horn und Schimansky, Bankrecht 1998, p. 265, 270.

³⁰ Cf. Roll, Vermogensverwaltung durch Kreditinstitute, p. 51 et seq.

³¹ Cf. Assmann und Schneider, Wertpapierhandelsgesetz (Kommentar), § 31 Rn. 22; Roll, Vermo­gensverwaltung durch Kreditinstitute, p. 45 et seq.; Balzer, Vermogensverwaltung durch Kreditinsti- tute, p. 26 et seq.

³² Cf. Horn und Schimansky, Bankrecht 1998, p. 265, 270 et seq.

³³ Cf. Roll, Vermogensverwaltung durch Kreditinstitute, p. 149.

³⁴ Cf. Assmann und Schneider, Wertpapierhandelsgesetz (Kommentar), § 31 Rn. 22; Balzer, Vermo- gensverwaltung durch Kreditinstitute, p. 120.

³⁵ Cf. Roll, Vermogensverwaltung durch Kreditinstitute, p. 149; Balzer, Vermogensverwaltung durch Kreditinstitute, p. 120.

³⁶ Cf. Roll, Vermogensverwaltung durch Kreditinstitute, p. 150; Balzer, Vermogensverwaltung durch Kreditinstitute, p. 120.

³⁷ Cf. Balzer, Vermogensverwaltung durch Kreditinstitute, p. 121; Roll, Vermogensverwaltung durch Kreditinstitute, p. 149.

³⁸ Cf. Balzer, Vermogensverwaltung durch Kreditinstitute, p. 121, Roll, Vermogensverwaltung durch Kreditinstitute, p. 150.

³⁹ Cf. Balzer, Vermogensverwaltung durch Kreditinstitute, p. 121; Roll, Vermogensverwaltung durch Kreditinstitute, p. 149.

⁴⁰ Cf. Roll, Vermogensverwaltung durch Kreditinstitute, p. 150.; Balzer, Vermogensverwaltung durch Kreditinstitute, p. 121.

⁴¹ Cf. Assmann und Schneider, Wertpapierhandelsgesetz (Kommentar), § 31 Rn. 22; Balzer, Vermo­gensverwaltung durch Kreditinstitute, p. 19.

⁴² Cf. Balzer, Vermogensverwaltung durch Kreditinstitute, p. 19 et seq.

⁴³ Cf. Roll, Vermogensverwaltung durch Kreditinstitute, p. 150; Balzer, Vermogensverwaltung durch Kreditinstitute, p. 121.

⁴⁴ Cf. Balzer, Vermogensverwaltung durch Kreditinstitute, p. 121.

⁴⁵ Cf. Assmann und Schneider, Wertpapierhandelsgesetz (Kommentar), § 31 Rn. 22; Roll, Vermo- gensverwaltung durch Kreditinstitute, p. 150, der der eine ausdruckliche vertragliche Regelung for- dert.

⁴⁶ Cf. Balzer, Vermogensverwaltung durch Kreditinstitute, p. 121 et seq.; Assmann und Schneider, Wertpapierhandelsgesetz (Kommentar), § 31 Rn. 22.

⁴⁷ Cf. Balzer, Vermogensverwaltung durch Kreditinstitute, p. 121.

⁴⁸ Cf. Wicke, Individuelle Vermogensverwaltung fur Privatkunden, p. 24; Balzer, Vermogensverwal­tung durch Kreditinstitute, p. 35 et seq.

⁴⁹ Cf. Balzer, Vermogensverwaltung durch Kreditinstitute, p. 36; Roll, Vermogensverwaltung durch Kreditinstitute, p. 60 et seq.

⁵⁰ Cf. Balzer, Vermogensverwaltung durch Kreditinstitute, p. 36.

⁵¹ Cf. Roll, Vermogensverwaltung durch Kreditinstitute, p. 60 et seq.

⁵² Cf. Balzer, Vermogensverwaltung durch Kreditinstitute, p. 47; Roll, Vermogensverwaltung durch Kreditinstitute, p. 66.

⁵³ See Roll, Vermogensverwaltung durch Kreditinstitute, p. 60 et seq.

⁵⁴ Cf. Balzer, Vermogensverwaltung durch Kreditinstitute, p. 48.

⁵⁵ Cf. Roll, Vermogensverwaltung durch Kreditinstitute, p. 60 et seq.

⁵⁶ Cf. Balzer, Vermogensverwaltung durch Kreditinstitute, p. 48.

⁵⁷ Cf. Balzer, Vermogensverwaltung durch Kreditinstitute, p. 49.

⁵⁸ Cf. Roll, Vermogensverwaltung durch Kreditinstitute, p. 65f.

⁵⁹ Cf. Balzer, Vermogensverwaltung durch Kreditinstitute, p. 49.

⁶⁰ Cf. Balzer, Vermogensverwaltung durch Kreditinstitute, p. 60 et seq.

⁶¹ Cf. Balzer, Vermogensverwaltung durch Kreditinstitute, p. 33 et seq.

⁶² Cf. Roll, Vermogensverwaltung durch Kreditinstitute, p. 73; Balzer, Vermogensverwaltung durch Kreditinstitute, p. 33 et seq.

⁶³ Cf. Balzer, Vermogensverwaltung durch Kreditinstitute, p. 33.

⁶⁴ Cf. Wicke, Individuelle Vermogensverwaltung fur Privatkunden, p. 24; Balzer, Vermogensverwal- tung durch Kreditinstitute, p. 34.

⁶⁵ Cf. Balzer, Vermogensverwaltung durch Kreditinstitute, p. 34.

⁶⁶ Cf. Balzer, Vermogensverwaltung durch Kreditinstitute, p. 34.

⁶⁷ Cf. Roll, Vermogensverwaltung durch Kreditinstitute, p. 48 et seq.

⁶⁸ Cf. Assmann und Schneider, Wertpapierhandelsgesetz (Kommentar), § 31 Rn. 76 et seq.; Roll, Vermogensverwaltung durch Kreditinstitute, p. 100.

⁶⁹ Cf. Wicke, Individuelle Vermogensverwaltung fur Privatkunden, p. 24; Balzer, Vermogensverwal- tung durch Kreditinstitute, p. 35; Roll, Vermogensverwaltung durch Kreditinstitute, p. 60 et seq.

⁷⁰ OLG Munchen WM 1994.

⁷¹ Cf. Horn und Schimansky, Bankrecht 1998, p. 265; Balzer, Vermogensverwaltung durch Kreditin- stitute, p. 49 et seq.

⁷² Cf. Balzer, Vermogensverwaltung durch Kreditinstitute, p. 49 et seq.

⁷³ So Schafer, ZBB 2000, 150, 151.

⁷⁴ Cf. Horn und Schimansky, Bankrecht 1998, p. 235, 239; Balzer, Vermogensverwaltung durch Kre- ditinstitute, p. 49.

⁷⁵ Cf. Horn und Schimansky, Bankrecht 1998, p. 265, 284.

⁷⁶ See BGHZ 123, 126, 128.

⁷⁷ Cf. Balzer, Vermogensverwaltung durch Kreditinstitute, p. 50; Horn und Schimansky, Bankrecht 1998, p. 265.

⁷⁸ Exemplarisch OLG Bamberg BKR 2002, 185.

⁷⁹ Cf. Balzer, Vermogensverwaltung durch Kreditinstitute, p. 50.

⁸⁰ Cf. Horn und Schimansky, Bankrecht 1998, p. 265, 285; Balzer, Vermogensverwaltung durch Kre- ditinstitute, p. 50.

⁸¹ Cf. Balzer, Vermogensverwaltung durch Kreditinstitute, p. 51.

⁸² Cf. Balzer, Vermogensverwaltung durch Kreditinstitute, p. 51.

⁸³ Dies verkennt der BGH in seinem Urteil vom 4.4.2002 (BKR 2002, 397 = ZIP 2002, 795 = WM 2002, 913); wie hier Balzer, Vermogensverwaltung durch Kreditinstitute, p. 51.

⁸⁴ See BGH BKR 2002, 397, 398 = ZIP 2002, 795, 796 = WM 2002,913,914.

⁸⁵ Cf. BGH WM 1996,906.

⁸⁶ Cf. Balzer, Vermogensverwaltung durch Kreditinstitute, p. 52.

⁸⁷ Cf. Horn und Schimansky, Bankrecht 1998, p. 265, 285.

⁸⁸ Der Bankenverband informiert (Bundesverband deutscher Banken e.V.), Nr. 10 Mai/Juni 1997, p. 293 et seq.

⁸⁹ Schwintowski und Schafer, Bankrecht. Commercial Banking - Investment Banking, § 12 Rn. 26.

⁹⁰ Schwintowski und Schafer, Bankrecht. Commercial Banking - Investment Banking, § 12 Rn. 26.

⁹¹ OLG Celle WM 1997, 1801.

⁹² OLG Celle WM 1997, 1801.

⁹³ Cf. Roll, Vermogensverwaltung durch Kreditinstitute, p. 86 et seq.; Balzer, Vermogensverwaltung durch Kreditinstitute, p. 38 et seq.

⁹⁴ Cf. Schafer und Muller, Haftung fur fehlerhafte Wertpapierdienstleistungen. Anlageberatung, Ver- mogensverwaltung, Borsentermingeschafte, Rn. 214.

⁹⁵ Cf. Balzer, Vermogensverwaltung durch Kreditinstitute, p. 39 et seq.; Roll, Vermogensverwaltung durch Kreditinstitute, p. 28; Schafer und Muller, Haftung fur fehlerhafte Wertpapierdienstleistungen. Anlageberatung, Vermogensverwaltung, Borsentermingeschafte, Rn. 214.

⁹⁶ Cf. Schafer und Muller, Haftung fur fehlerhafte Wertpapierdienstleistungen. Anlageberatung, Ver- mogensverwaltung, Borsentermingeschafte, Rn. 214.

⁹⁷ Cf. Balzer, Vermogensverwaltung durch Kreditinstitute, p. 40.

⁹⁸ Cf. Balzer, Vermogensverwaltung durch Kreditinstitute, p. 40.

⁹⁹ Cf. Balzer, Vermogensverwaltung durch Kreditinstitute, p. 40,174 et seq.

¹⁰⁰ Cf. Roll, Vermogensverwaltung durch Kreditinstitute, p. 123 et seq.

¹⁰¹ Cf. Balzer, Vermogensverwaltung durch Kreditinstitute, p. 41; Roll, Vermogensverwaltung durch Kreditinstitute, p. 127 et seq.

¹⁰² Cf. Schafer und Muller, Haftung fur fehlerhafte Wertpapierdienstleistungen. Anlageberatung, Vermogensverwaltung, Borsentermingeschafte, Rn. 216.

¹⁰³ Cf. Schafer und Muller, Haftung fur fehlerhafte Wertpapierdienstleistungen. Anlageberatung, Vermogensverwaltung, Borsentermingeschafte, Rn. 216.

¹⁰⁴ Cf. Schafer und Muller, Haftung fur fehlerhafte Wertpapierdienstleistungen. Anlageberatung, Vermogensverwaltung, Borsentermingeschafte, Rn. 217.

¹⁰⁵ Cf. Schafer und Muller, Haftung fur fehlerhafte Wertpapierdienstleistungen. Anlageberatung, Vermogensverwaltung, Borsentermingeschafte, Rn. 217, 299 et seq.

¹⁰⁶ Cf. Schafer und Muller, Haftung fur fehlerhafte Wertpapierdienstleistungen. Anlageberatung, Vermogensverwaltung, Borsentermingeschafte, Rn. 217.

¹⁰⁷ Cf. OLG Oldenburg WM 1996, 255.

¹⁰⁸ Cf. Schafer und Muller, Haftung fur fehlerhafte Wertpapierdienstleistungen. Anlageberatung, Vermogensverwaltung, Borsentermingeschafte, Rn. 301.

¹⁰⁹ Horn, ZBB 1997, 139,147; Cf. Assmann und Schneider, Wertpapierhandelsgesetz (Kommentar), § 31 Rn. 142.

¹¹⁰ See GaBner und Eschner, WM 1997, 93, 55.

¹¹¹ Cf. Assmann und Schneider, Wertpapierhandelsgesetz (Kommentar), § 31 Rn. 76, 142.

¹¹² Cf. Roll, Vermogensverwaltung durch Kreditinstitute, p. 123 et seq.

¹¹³ Cf. Horn und Schimansky, Bankrecht 1998, p. 265.

¹¹⁴ Cf. Assmann und Schneider, Wertpapierhandelsgesetz (Kommentar), Einleitung, Rn 32. 32 et seq.

¹¹⁵ Cf. Assmann und Schneider, Wertpapierhandelsgesetz (Kommentar), § 31 Rn. 22.

¹¹⁶ Cf. Schafer und Muller, Haftung fur fehlerhafte Wertpapierdienstleistungen. Anlageberatung, Ver­mogensverwaltung, Borsentermingeschafte, Rn. 238.

¹¹⁷ Cf. Assmann und Schneider, Wertpapierhandelsgesetz (Kommentar), § 31 Rn. 142.

¹¹⁸ Cf. Assmann und Schneider, Wertpapierhandelsgesetz (Kommentar), 31 Rn 83.

¹¹⁹ Cf. Balzer, Vermogensverwaltung durch Kreditinstitute, p. 73; Horn und Schimansky, Bankrecht 1998, p. 265, 285; Schafer und Muller, Haftung fur fehlerhafte Wertpapierdienstleistungen. Anlagebe- ratung, Vermogensverwaltung, Borsentermingeschafte, Rn. 242.

¹²⁰ Cf. Balzer, Vermogensverwaltung durch Kreditinstitute, p. 73 et seq.; Schafer und Muller, Haftung fur fehlerhafte Wertpapierdienstleistungen. Anlageberatung, Vermogensverwaltung, Borsenterminge- schafte, Rn. 242.

¹²¹ See GaBner und Eschner, WM 1997, 93, 96.

¹²² Cf. Balzer, Vermogensverwaltung durch Kreditinstitute, p. 75.

¹²³ Cf. Schafer und Muller, Haftung fur fehlerhafte Wertpapierdienstleistungen. Anlageberatung, Vermogensverwaltung, Borsentermingeschafte, Rn. 243; Balzer, Vermogensverwaltung durch Kredit- institute, p. 75.

¹²⁴ Cf. Balzer, Vermogensverwaltung durch Kreditinstitute, p. 75.

¹²⁵ See GaBner und Eschner, WM 1997, 93, 96; Schafer und Muller, Haftung fur fehlerhafte Wertpa- pierdienstleistungen. Anlageberatung, Vermogensverwaltung, Borsentermingeschafte, Rn. 246.

¹²⁶ Cf. Assmann und Schneider, Wertpapierhandelsgesetz (Kommentar), §31 Rn. 83; Schafer und Muller, Haftung fur fehlerhafte Wertpapierdienstleistungen. Anlageberatung, Vermogensverwaltung, Borsentermingeschafte, Rn. 243.

¹²⁷ Balzer, Vermogensverwaltung durch Kreditinstitute, p. 75.

¹²⁸ Assmann und Schneider, Wertpapierhandelsgesetz (Kommentar), §31 Rn.120.

¹²⁹ Cf. Schwintowski und Schafer, Bankrecht. Commercial Banking - Investment Banking, § 11 Rn. 74 et seq.

¹³⁰ Cf. Assmann und Schneider, Wertpapierhandelsgesetz (Kommentar), § 31 Rn. 88.

¹³¹ Cf. Horn und Schimansky, Bankrecht 1998, p. 235, 253; Assmann und Schneider, Wertpapierhan- delsgesetz (Kommentar), § 31 Rn. 90.

¹³² Cf. Schafer und Muller, Haftung fur fehlerhafte Wertpapierdienstleistungen. Anlageberatung, Vermogensverwaltung, Borsentermingeschafte, Rn. 251; Balzer, Vermogensverwaltung durch Kredit- institute, p. 78.

¹³³ Eingehend zu diesem Thema Lang, ZBB 1999, 218, 221 et seq.

¹³⁴ BGH ZIP 1996, 1161; BGH ZIP 1996, 2064.

¹³⁵ See Nobbe in Horn und Schimansky, Bankrecht 1998, p. 235, 253.

¹³⁶ Cf. BGH ZIP 1996, 1161.

¹³⁷ Cf. Horn und Schimansky, Bankrecht 1998, p. 265, 271; Roll, Vermogensverwaltung durch Kredit- institute, p. 52 et seq.

¹³⁸ Cf. Schafer und Muller, Haftung fur fehlerhafte Wertpapierdienstleistungen. Anlageberatung, Vermogensverwaltung, Borsentermingeschafte, Rn. 249; Assmann und Schneider, Wertpapierhan- delsgesetz (Kommentar), § 31 Rn. 94.

¹³⁹ Cf. http://www.bafin.de/verordnungen/umlagevo99.htm

¹⁴⁰ Cf. Schafer und Muller, Haftung fur fehlerhafte Wertpapierdienstleistungen. Anlageberatung, Vermogensverwaltung, Borsentermingeschafte, Rn. 249.

¹⁴¹ Cf. Schafer und Muller, Haftung fur fehlerhafte Wertpapierdienstleistungen. Anlageberatung, Ver- mogensverwaltung, Borsentermingeschafte, Rn. 243.

¹⁴² Cf. Schafer und Muller, Haftung fur fehlerhafte Wertpapierdienstleistungen. Anlageberatung, Vermogensverwaltung, Borsentermingeschafte, Rn. 245.

¹⁴³ Cf. Schafer und Muller, Haftung fur fehlerhafte Wertpapierdienstleistungen. Anlageberatung, Vermogensverwaltung, Borsentermingeschafte, Rn. 245.

¹⁴⁴ Cf. Schafer und Muller, Haftung fur fehlerhafte Wertpapierdienstleistungen. Anlageberatung, Vermogensverwaltung, Borsentermingeschafte, Rn. 245.

¹⁴⁵ Cf. Schafer und Muller, Haftung fur fehlerhafte Wertpapierdienstleistungen. Anlageberatung, Vermogensverwaltung, Borsentermingeschafte, Rn. 245.

¹⁴⁶ Cf. Balzer, Vermogensverwaltung durch Kreditinstitute, p. 79; Horn und Schimansky, Bankrecht 1998, p. 235, 243; Assmann und Schneider, Wertpapierhandelsgesetz (Kommentar), § 31 Rn 92 et

seq.

¹⁴⁷ Cf. Schafer und Muller, Haftung fur fehlerhafte Wertpapierdienstleistungen. Anlageberatung, Vermogensverwaltung, Borsentermingeschafte, Rn. 251.

¹⁴⁸ Cf. Schafer und Muller, Haftung fur fehlerhafte Wertpapierdienstleistungen. Anlageberatung, Vermogensverwaltung, Borsentermingeschafte, Rn. 251.

¹⁴⁹ Cf. Assmann und Schneider, Wertpapierhandelsgesetz (Kommentar), § 31 Rn. 90.

¹⁵⁰ Cf. Koller in Assmann und Schneider, Wertpapierhandelsgesetz (Kommentar), § 31 Rn. 94.

¹⁵¹ Cf. Schafer und Muller, Haftung fur fehlerhafte Wertpapierdienstleistungen. Anlageberatung, Vermogensverwaltung, Borsentermingeschafte, Rn. 249.

¹⁵² Cf. ZBB 1997, 97, 101.

¹⁵³ Cf. Assmann und Schneider, Wertpapierhandelsgesetz (Kommentar), § 31 Rn. 2a.

¹⁵⁴ See Koller ZBB 1996, 97, 101; Assmann und Schneider, Wertpapierhandelsgesetz (Kommentar), § 31 Rn. 86.

¹⁵⁵ See Koller ZBB 1996, 97, 101.